Senators demand national‑security review of $500M UAE investment in Trump‑linked crypto firm WLFI
Two Democratic senators are urging the US Treasury Department to scrutinize a half‑billion‑dollar investment from the United Arab Emirates in a cryptocurrency venture connected to the Trump family, warning that the deal could hand a foreign government access to sensitive financial and personal data of Americans.
In a letter sent Friday to Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, Senators Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts and Andy Kim of New Jersey asked whether the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), which Bessent chairs, has been formally notified of the transaction. If not, they are pressing the administration to initiate a full national‑security review of the deal.
At the center of their concerns is a reported agreement under which a UAE‑backed investment vehicle committed about 500 million dollars to acquire a 49% stake in World Liberty Financial (WLFI), a digital‑asset and financial‑technology platform associated with the Trump family. According to the lawmakers, the transaction took place just days before Donald Trump’s inauguration and would make the UAE fund WLFI’s largest shareholder and its only publicly known outside equity investor.
The senators argue that such a sizable, foreign‑state‑backed stake in a US‑based crypto firm that gathers extensive user data raises red flags for national security and the integrity of the US financial system. They asked Bessent to confirm whether CFIUS has reviewed or is currently reviewing the deal and to ensure any inquiry is “comprehensive, thorough, and unbiased.”
The investment has reportedly been arranged with backing from Sheikh Tahnoon bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the UAE’s national security adviser and a powerful figure within the Abu Dhabi ruling family. The letter states that roughly 187 million dollars from the transaction was earmarked for entities tied to the Trump family. It also notes that the agreement would provide two board seats to executives associated with G42, a technology and AI company that has previously drawn scrutiny from US intelligence officials over its alleged ties to China.
For Warren and Kim, this corporate structure is not a technicality but a potential vector of foreign influence. They contend that a foreign government, acting through a state‑aligned investment fund, could gain both board‑level leverage and indirect access to a trove of data on US customers. In their view, that combination is precisely the kind of risk CFIUS was designed to evaluate.
The senators highlight WLFI’s own privacy disclosures, which state that the platform collects cryptocurrency wallet addresses, IP addresses, device identifiers, approximate geolocation data and, in some cases, identity‑related information obtained through third‑party service providers. Because this information can be used to track user behavior, map out financial networks and profile individuals, they argue that a foreign power’s stake in such a company is not just a commercial issue, but a national‑security concern.
CFIUS is a multi‑agency panel led by the Treasury Department that reviews foreign investments and acquisitions involving US businesses. Its mandate is to identify and, if necessary, block or modify deals that could allow foreign actors to access sensitive technologies, critical infrastructure or personal data of US citizens. In recent years, CFIUS has increasingly focused on data‑rich firms, including technology and fintech companies, not just traditional defense assets.
Warren and Kim requested formal answers from Bessent by March 5, including whether CFIUS was notified, whether it has opened a review and what safeguards, if any, are in place to prevent foreign misuse of US customer data associated with WLFI. They also want to know whether the reported board seats and financial flows to Trump‑linked entities were factored into any risk assessment.
This is not the first time WLFI has drawn attention on Capitol Hill. The previous year, Warren and Senator Jack Reed pressed US authorities to investigate allegations that World Liberty Financial’s token sales may have involved sanctioned foreign actors. In a separate letter to the Justice Department and the Treasury, they cited claims that WLFI governance tokens were purchased by blockchain addresses believed to be associated with North Korea’s Lazarus Group, as well as entities linked to Russia and Iran. Those allegations, if validated, would put the company at the intersection of US sanctions policy, illicit finance and crypto regulation.
The new UAE‑backed equity deal now adds an additional layer of concern: not just who is using the platform, but who owns and influences it. For lawmakers focused on financial security and foreign interference, that ownership question is especially sensitive when it involves a company tied to a former president and active political figure.
Earlier this month, Donald Trump publicly distanced himself from the reported multimillion‑dollar UAE investment in WLFI‑related entities. Speaking to reporters, he said he was not directly involved in the negotiations and placed responsibility on his relatives. “My sons are handling that — my family is handling it,” he said, adding that he understood they receive investments from “different people.” His comments suggest he sees the deal as a matter of private business, rather than national security, in contrast with the senators’ framing.
The WLFI venture itself has been positioned by its backers as a broad financial platform, with reported plans that include foreign exchange and remittance services, alongside digital‑asset products. That business model, if realized at scale, would move significant volumes of payments and customer information through its systems. From a regulatory and security standpoint, that makes questions about ownership and oversight more pressing, not less.
Privacy advocates and national‑security experts point out that data such as IP addresses and transaction histories, when combined, can reveal far more than individual purchase details. They can map social networks, uncover political affiliations, identify dissidents or journalists and expose the spending patterns of public officials. In a world where data is often described as the “new oil,” control over a platform that aggregates such information is increasingly seen as a strategic asset.
CFIUS has previously taken action against foreign involvement in data‑heavy companies, including ordering divestments or imposing mitigation agreements that restrict how data can be accessed or transferred. The senators’ letter implicitly asks whether a similar level of scrutiny is being applied to WLFI, given both the volume of user data it may collect and the political sensitivity of its ownership ties.
The geopolitical dimension of the deal also looms large. The UAE is a close security partner of the United States, but its growing technological ambitions and relationships with both Western and non‑Western powers have become a subject of careful monitoring in Washington. Investments routed through state‑linked funds have increasingly been evaluated not only for financial motives but also for potential strategic or political goals.
Overlaying this is the broader debate about foreign money and US politics. An investment that reportedly channels 187 million dollars toward entities linked to the Trump family while a Trump‑associated firm retains operational control could raise perception issues even if no laws are broken. Critics worry that such arrangements can create subtle incentives or expectations, especially if the foreign counterparty is a government or a royal family, rather than a purely commercial investor.
Crypto’s unique characteristics amplify these worries. Digital assets move across borders at high speed and often with limited transparency. If a platform like WLFI becomes a major hub for such flows, regulators must reckon not only with the origin and destination of funds, but with who steers the platform’s growth strategy and compliance culture. Foreign board members or major shareholders could push for more aggressive expansion in markets or products that heighten regulatory and security risks.
For US regulators, the WLFI case is a test of how existing tools like CFIUS can be adapted to the evolving crypto and fintech landscape. The committee was originally designed to stop adversarial takeovers of defense contractors and critical infrastructure. Today, its remit increasingly includes apps, payment systems and data‑centric services that might look purely commercial on the surface, yet hold deep strategic value underneath.
The senators’ demands also underscore a growing political consensus that sensitive financial platforms — particularly those handling crypto transactions and cross‑border flows — should not be lightly opened to foreign state influence. Even allied governments are being scrutinized more closely, especially when investments coincide with domestic political stakes.
The outcome of any CFIUS review, if launched, could have ramifications beyond one company or one deal. A decision to block or heavily condition the UAE investment would send a signal to other sovereign wealth funds and state‑backed investors eyeing stakes in US digital‑asset firms. Conversely, a decision to allow the transaction without significant restrictions would likely fuel further debate in Congress about whether current law adequately covers the national‑security implications of foreign capital in the crypto sector.
For now, Warren and Kim have placed the ball firmly in the Treasury Department’s court. Their questions, and the looming March 5 deadline for answers, ensure that World Liberty Financial’s ownership structure, its data‑collection practices and its ties to both foreign governments and a prominent US political family will remain under an intense spotlight.

