Ethereum is moving quantum security from theory to action, unveiling a dedicated post‑quantum (PQ) security team, new funding programs and test networks designed to harden the protocol before large‑scale quantum computers arrive.
The Ethereum Foundation has elevated post‑quantum readiness to a core pillar of its long‑term roadmap. A specialized Post Quantum team has been created inside the Foundation, tasked with steering research, experimentation and practical upgrades that can protect the network’s cryptography against future quantum attacks.
The new unit is headed by cryptographic engineer Thomas Coratger, with additional leadership support from Emile, a cryptographer closely linked to the leanVM project. Crypto researcher Justin Drake highlighted the significance of the move, noting that after several years of relatively quiet research and development, Foundation leadership has formally designated PQ security as a top strategic priority. In his words, the industry is now operating on accelerated timelines and needs to “go full PQ.”
At the heart of Ethereum’s vision for a quantum‑resilient future is leanVM, a minimalistic zero‑knowledge proof virtual machine (zkVM). Drake described leanVM as a key building block for Ethereum’s post‑quantum architecture, enabling more efficient and flexible cryptographic constructions that can sit at the core of future protocol upgrades and advanced signature schemes.
To translate research into practice, Ethereum developers are launching a recurring forum to focus specifically on PQ‑ready transactions. Starting next month, biweekly sessions led by Ethereum researcher Antonio Sanso will bring together core devs and cryptographers to design and test quantum‑resistant transaction flows. These sessions will emphasize user‑facing protections: new protocol‑level primitives, improved account abstraction mechanisms and longer‑term efforts to aggregate transaction signatures using leanVM‑powered techniques.
The Foundation is backing this technical shift with substantial new funding. Drake announced the creation of the Poseidon Prize, a 1 million dollar program aimed at stress‑testing and strengthening the Poseidon hash function, a building block widely used in zero‑knowledge systems. Alongside it, a second 1 million dollar initiative, the Proximity Prize, will support broader work in post‑quantum cryptography, including new schemes, formal analyses and implementation research relevant to Ethereum’s roadmap.
On the engineering side, Ethereum is no longer in the purely theoretical phase. Drake revealed that multi‑client post‑quantum consensus development networks are already live. Multiple teams are experimenting with PQ‑capable consensus implementations and coordinating progress through weekly interoperability calls. The multi‑client approach mirrors Ethereum’s existing mainnet philosophy: no single implementation is allowed to dominate, which reduces systemic risk and helps uncover edge cases earlier.
The organization is also planning a calendar of public events dedicated to quantum security. A specialized post‑quantum gathering is scheduled for October, with a focused post‑quantum day planned for late March, just ahead of the next EthCC conference. These events are expected to serve as focal points for sharing research, aligning on standards and onboarding new contributors to PQ‑related work.
Beyond the research community, education is a major part of the plan. The Foundation is preparing video content and enterprise‑oriented materials to explain quantum risks, outline Ethereum’s mitigation strategies and provide guidance for wallet providers, infrastructure companies and application developers. The goal is to make sure that by the time concrete migrations are required, the broader ecosystem understands the rationale, trade‑offs and operational steps.
This push comes at a moment when concerns about quantum risk are becoming more mainstream across the digital asset space. Coinbase recently disclosed the creation of an independent advisory board tasked with analyzing how advances in quantum computing could impact the cryptographic foundations of major blockchains, including Bitcoin and Ethereum. The board consists of specialists from academia and industry with expertise in quantum computing, cryptography and blockchain security.
The Coinbase advisory board plans to publish open research and practical recommendations for developers, organizations and end‑users on how to prepare for different quantum threat scenarios. Its first formal position paper is expected in early 2027, suggesting that large institutions see quantum readiness as a multi‑year planning horizon rather than a distant abstraction.
Why quantum computing is a real risk for blockchains
Current blockchain security rests largely on two families of cryptographic assumptions: the hardness of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (used in digital signatures such as ECDSA and EdDSA) and the difficulty of certain hash‑based puzzles. Quantum algorithms, most notably Shor’s algorithm, threaten the first category. A sufficiently powerful quantum computer could, in principle, derive a private key from a public key, undermining the security of user accounts, validator keys and multisig wallets.
For Ethereum and other chains, the most immediate theoretical risk would be to addresses whose public keys are already exposed on‑chain—typically through past transactions. If quantum machines become strong enough, attackers might be able to reconstruct private keys associated with those public keys and seize control of funds or validator operations. While experts disagree on timelines, the cost of being wrong is extremely high, which is why the Ethereum Foundation is choosing to move early.
What post‑quantum Ethereum might look like
Post‑quantum cryptography focuses on schemes believed to remain secure even in the presence of large‑scale quantum computers. These include lattice‑based, hash‑based, code‑based and isogeny‑based constructions. A PQ‑hardened Ethereum will likely use a combination of such primitives for signatures, key exchange and potentially some hashing, while keeping performance and transaction costs within acceptable bounds.
Ethereum’s account abstraction efforts are particularly relevant here. By decoupling account behavior from rigid, protocol‑level signature rules, account abstraction makes it easier to upgrade wallets to new cryptographic schemes without forcing disruptive global changes. In a PQ future, users might migrate to smart‑contract wallets that support both “classical” and post‑quantum signatures, gradually phasing out vulnerable keys as better options become efficient and battle‑tested.
Transitions, migration and user impact
For regular users, the shift to PQ security is likely to be gradual rather than overnight. Early on, Ethereum may introduce PQ‑capable signature schemes as an option, allowing power users, institutions and high‑value accounts to adopt them first. Over time, default wallet software could start generating PQ‑secure keys by default, while offering automated migration paths from older key types.
One open question is how to handle “zombie risk” — long‑dormant accounts whose owners may no longer have access to their keys, but which hold significant value. Once quantum attacks become practical, these accounts would be attractive targets. The community may need to debate social‑layer or protocol‑level mechanisms to reduce systemic risk from such legacy keys, ranging from time‑locked migration incentives to new recovery or rotation frameworks.
Developers and infrastructure providers should expect to adapt as well. Smart contracts that verify signatures, operate rollups or interact with zero‑knowledge systems will need to be audited for PQ compatibility. Node operators may eventually need to run clients that support hybrid or PQ‑only consensus signatures. The ongoing multi‑client PQ devnets are an early proving ground for these kinds of upgrades, giving engineering teams a controlled environment to test assumptions and measure performance impacts.
Performance and cost trade‑offs
One of the main challenges in adopting post‑quantum schemes is their resource footprint. Many PQ signature systems have larger public keys and signatures than today’s elliptic curve schemes, which can impact block sizes, transaction costs and network bandwidth. Projects like leanVM are partly an answer to this problem: by offering efficient zero‑knowledge tooling, they can help compress or aggregate proofs and signatures, reducing on‑chain overhead.
The Ethereum Foundation’s funding for work on the Poseidon hash function and broader PQ cryptography is aimed at balancing security with practicality. New primitives need not only to be mathematically sound, but also implementable in real‑world conditions, where gas costs, latency and hardware constraints matter. Incentive programs like the Poseidon and Proximity Prizes encourage the global research community to stress‑test assumptions and propose optimizations.
Industry‑wide coordination is inevitable
Although Ethereum is taking a proactive stance, quantum risk is not a problem any single network can solve in isolation. Bitcoin, Ethereum, layer‑2 rollups, sidechains and even centralized custodians share many of the same cryptographic foundations. The emergence of advisory bodies like Coinbase’s quantum board signals an emerging recognition that standards, timelines and education efforts need to be broadly aligned to avoid fragmentation and confusion.
Over the coming years, one can expect growing collaboration between protocol teams, academic cryptographers and hardware experts. Benchmarks for “quantum readiness,” threat‑modeling frameworks and recommended migration paths will likely be developed and refined. Ethereum’s public devnets, events and educational content are early entries in what may become a shared toolkit for the entire industry.
What users can do today
While fully post‑quantum Ethereum is still a work in progress, individuals and organizations can already take some low‑regret steps. Minimizing the exposure of public keys (for example, avoiding unnecessary address reuse), using reputable wallets that are likely to adopt PQ upgrades early, and keeping good key‑management hygiene all reduce potential future attack surfaces. Institutions with large on‑chain positions may want to start internal planning for eventual migrations and monitor the work of groups like the Ethereum PQ team and independent quantum risk boards.
Quantum‑safe Ethereum will not emerge from a single hard fork or software release. It will be the result of layered, incremental changes—from new research grants to devnets, from upgraded wallets to revised standards—implemented over several years. By forming a dedicated post‑quantum security team, launching funded research initiatives and coordinating across multiple client implementations, the Ethereum Foundation is signaling that this long transition has already begun.